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EMPLOYMENT LAW


Is a Locomotive In Use and Therefore Subject to Locomotive
Inspection Act Liability When It Makes a Temporary Stop?

CASE AT A GLANCE
Bradley LeDure, a long-time locomotive engineer for Union Pacific, slipped on the slick surface
of a locomotive while it was idle but powered on, seriously injuring himself. If Union Pacific
violated safety regulations under the Locomotive Inspection Act, then it would be negligent
per se. But that theory of liability is only available if the locomotive was in use at the time of
the accident. The case presents a question of statutory interpretation of the term use.



LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
Docket No. 20-807
Argument Date: March 28, 2022 From: The Seventh Circuit
by Anne Marie Lofaso
West Virginia University College of Law, Morgantown, WV

Introduction

carrier violated an LIA safety regulation, then the violation
constitutes negligence per se under FELA and the carrier is
liable for damages. Significantly, for liability to attach, the
locomotive where the alleged accident occurred must have
been in use.

Congress enacted the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., to internalize costs
associated with the railroad industries’ historically
dangerous working conditions. FELA created a tort cause
of action for injured railroad workers against their railroad
employers, which serves as the only recovery route for
damages caused by workplace injuries. To prevail, the
injured worker must show that the injury resulted from
the railroad’s negligence, a standard that a plaintiff can
meet by proving general negligence or by showing that
the railroad violated “‘any statute enacted for the safety of
employees.’” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (quoting
45 U.S.C. §§ 53–54; holding that a railroad’s violation of
the Boiler Inspection Act and the Safety Appliance Act are
negligence per se under FELA).

Here, a locomotive engineer entered an idle but powered
on locomotive when he slipped and fell, seriously injuring
himself.

Issue

Is a locomotive in use on a railroad’s line and subject to
the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq.,
and its safety regulations when its train makes a temporary
stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate
commerce?

Facts

Congress enacted the Locomotive Inspection Act
(LIA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701–03, which amended FELA by
empowering the secretary of transportation to promulgate
regulations placing specific duties onto railroad carriers
dealing with the safe use and operation of locomotives. If
an injured railroad employee can show that the railroad
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

On August 12, 2016, petitioner Bradley LeDure, a longtime locomotive engineer for respondent Union Pacific
Railroad Company, arrived at work in Salem, Illinois,
at approximately 2:00 a.m., about the same time that
a train transporting freight from Chicago, Illinois, to
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Dexter, Missouri, entered the station. That train, which
was powered by three diesel locomotives, was scheduled
to continue its journey at about 3:00 a.m. Under Union
Pacific’s fuel conservation policy, LeDure and his
conductor had to decide how many diesel locomotives
were needed for the rest of the trip. Upon making that
decision, the crew, including LeDure, would power down
the unnecessary locomotives. They decided that only one
of the three diesel locomotives was necessary.

it is fully assembled and the crew has completed those
pre-departure inspections); Estes v. Southern Pacific, 598
F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that in use means “used
in moving interstate or foreign traffic”). Applying Lyle,
but noting that the outcome would not change under any
of the court-established standards, the district court held
that the locomotive was not in use because “the train was
(1) stationary; (2) on a backtrack in the depot yard; (3) had
not yet been inspected or tagged; and (4) perhaps most
importantly, the engineers had not yet assembled the cars
on the train for its next use in interstate commerce.” The
court thereafter denied LeDure’s motion to alter or amend
its judgment.

LeDure entered diesel locomotive UP5683, which was
idling and had not yet been powered down. LeDure
slipped on a greasy substance while walking on locomotive
UP5683 and fell, striking his head, back, and shoulders.
LeDure seriously injured his shoulders, spine, back, neck,
left and right hands/fingers, and head.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit (Circuit Judges William J. Bauer, Michael S. Kanne,
and Amy Coney Barrett) affirmed the district court’s
conclusion and its reasoning that UP5683 was not in use
and therefore that LIA and its safety regulations were
“inapplicable” because it was “stationary, on a sidetrack,
and part of a train needing to be assembled before its use
in interstate commerce.” In so holding, the court rejected
LeDure’s argument that “a locomotive is not ‘in use’ only
when it is being repaired,” as “an unduly narrow reading of
Lyle and its progeny.” The court also affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Union Pacific on
LeDure’s general negligence claims. The court thereafter
denied LeDure’s motion for rehearing en banc.

LeDure sued Union Pacific in federal court, alleging two
theories of liability. First, LeDure asserted Union Pacific’s
failure to comply with safety regulations under the LIA
constituted negligence per se under FELA. Second, LeDure
asserted a general negligence theory under FELA, which is
not at issue in the Supreme Court.
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois (J. Phil Gilbert, District Judge) granted Union
Pacific’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
LIA did not apply because the locomotive was not in use
at the time of the accident. The court concluded that,
although the statutory text plainly stated that a locomotive
must be in use to trigger LIA’s mandatory duties, the text
was ambiguous as to the meaning of in use. The court
therefore reviewed appellate courts’ interpretations of
that term, noting that they were “all over the place.” See
Lyle v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 177 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1949) (instructing that “[t]o service an engine while it is
out of use, to put it in readiness for use, is the antithesis
of using it” but failing to create a concrete test for when a
locomotive is in use); see also Deans v. CSX Transportation,
Inc., 152 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (utilizing a totality of the
circumstances test for determining in “use” with the most
important factors being where the train was located; if the
train was stationary, what time the train was scheduled
to depart; and what the injured party was doing at the
time of the accident); McGrath v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
136 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that a locomotive
is in use when it is running on the track and ready to
move into service, and the worker was injured while
performing pre-departure inspection duties); Trinidad
v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 949 F.2d 187 (5th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a locomotive is not in use until
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court granted LeDure’s petition for certiorari
on the meaning of the word use under the LIA.

Case Analysis

This case is very narrow. It will decide the meaning of the
word use for purposes of LIA liability.
Petitioner LeDure asserts two affirmative arguments to
support his view that the LIA applies in this case. First,
LeDure contends that LIA’s plain language and ordinary
usage of the term use and the phrase allow to be used
are expansive and encompass a locomotive temporarily
stopped during its assigned trip. LeDure explains that
this expansive definition can be found in dictionaries
published at the time of the LIA’s enactment and in
modern dictionaries. His related point, that the LIA’s
structure and the context within which the term use
is made “confirms that the transit of a locomotive to a
destination, even if the locomotive is not engaged in
hauling, qualifies as a ‘use’ under the [LIA and related
statutes].” Relatedly, LeDure shows that his reading of the
term use is consistent with all on-point Supreme Court
23
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precedent. LeDure further shows that the Supreme Court’s
precedent interpreting the term use in other contexts also
supports a broad reading of the term in this case. Second,
to bolster his plain language argument, LeDure asserts
that his construction of the term use and the even broader
phrase allowed to be used, advances the LIA’s remedial
purpose—to improve safety for rail workers.

injuries to these twilight areas. By contrast, a win for the
respondent will narrow liability, which means that rail
workers will have a much harder time proving their injury
cases. There are, however, more than two interpretations
of the term use; therefore, the number of workers affected
by the Court’s ruling is unclear.
Second, this case will reveal more about the newer justices’
views on textualism and how the structure of legislation,
context, legislative history, and policy affect the textual
analysis. Both sides agree that undefined statutory terms
must receive their ordinary meaning. The sides simply
disagree on what that meaning really is. Accordingly, while
there is a consensus on the approach—start with the text
and then deal with legislative structure, context, history,
policy, and other factors—application of that approach is
far from clear.

Respondent Union Pacific also asserts two affirmative
arguments to support its narrower construction of
the LIA’s term use. First, respondent argues that LIA’s
plain language and the context in which the term use is
employed, “make clear that ‘using’ a locomotive requires
active employment as a locomotive.” To support its
construction, respondent turns to dictionary definitions
of the term use that focus on functionality, such as “‘to
put to a purpose.’” Respondent bolsters this construction
by relying on a Supreme Court case interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)’s term use in that criminal statute’s clause
“uses or carries a firearm.” Respondent further asserts
that LIA’s statutory history and the greater statutory
structure support its narrower construction. Second,
respondent argues that a broader interpretation, such as
the one put forward by petitioner, “threatens to impose
extraordinary and pointless burdens on railroads.”
Respondent uses data to support its claim that a broad
interpretation of the term use would magnify claims and
encourage fraudulent claims.

Anne Marie Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges Professor
of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law
in Morgantown, West Virginia. She can be reached at
304.293.7356 or anne.lofaso@mail.wvu.edu.
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES
For Petitioner Bradley LeDure (David C. Frederick,
202.326.7900)

Both petitioner and respondent contend that their
opponent’s arguments cannot be reconciled with Supreme
Court precedent. Both further argue that their client
prevails if the Court accepts their construction of the LIA.

For Respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company (J. Scott
Ballenger, 202.701.4925)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Bradley LeDure
Sheet Metal, Air, Rail Transportation Workers—
Transportation Division (Lawrence M. Mann,
202.298.9191)

Significance

This case could be significant for two reasons. First, the
case will clean up confusing and contradictory precedent
that goes in all different directions. Relatedly, a win for
the petitioner will extend railroad liability for worker
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United States (Elizabeth Prelogar, Solicitor General,
202.514.2217)
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